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LEGISLATION NOTE

THE OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE
VOLUNTARY BAR SYSTEM-A PERFECT FIT?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last few years, the Ohio State Bar Association
(O.S.B.A.) has been embroiled in a highly publicized confrontation
with the Ohio Supreme Court.1 In the midst of this "battle," the court
has removed many long-held rights and privileges of the state's bar association.' The impairment of those activities calls into question the
effectiveness and utility of the O.S.B.A. in the performance of its remaining functions.
Among the most prominent functions of a bar association is its
legislative activity. The Ohio State Bar Association, as a perennial
sponsor of major legislative changes,' has certainly been no exception.
This note will examine the reasons why the lobbying activity of a state
bar, such as Ohio's, is so vital to legislative reform at the state level. In
addition, it will also compare the type of bar system that is followed in
Ohio with those employed in other states in an attempt to determine
which system can most effectively execute the O.S.B.A.'s role in the
legislative process.

1. See, e.g., Columbus Dispatch, Aug. 1, 1984, at AI0, col. 1; id., Aug. 3, 1984, at BI, col.
4; id., Aug. 5, 1984, at Al, col. 1; Dayton Daily News, Aug. 18, 1984, at 3, col. 1.
2. Since 1982, the Ohio State Bar Association has lost the following powers:
1) The right to print decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court and other Ohio courts.
2) The right to investigate grievances against lawyers and judges or to prosecute complaints regarding legal ethics or unauthorized practices of law.
3) The Supreme Court terminated its subscription to Ohio State Bar Association publications and removed the Ohio Bar Reports from its library shelves.
4) The Ohio State Bar Association has been unable to receive lists of successful bar examination applicants or lists of attorneys registered to practice before the Ohio Supreme
Court.
Letter from Frank E. Bazler, president of the Ohio State Bar Association, to members of
the Ohio
State Bar Association (July 25, 1984) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
In addition, the Ohio State Bar Association has revised its judicial rating system in response
to a proposal which is being considered by an Ohio Supreme Court committee that would
authorize formal disciplinary action against attorneys who participate in rating programs that
are
outside court guidelines. Frank, Discipline Specter Raised in Ohio Judicial Ratings,
BAR
LEADER, Jan.-Feb., 1985, at 6.
3. See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND

The Role of the State Bar in the Lawmaking Process

4
For many years, state bar associations have played an active role
in the legislative systems that exist in the United States. In pursuing
the complementary goals of improving the administration of justice and
5
advancing the science of jurisprudence, state bar associations have
made some of the legal profession's greatest contributions to the lawmaking process.6
There are two basic functions a state bat performs in the legislative process. First, it serves as an instrument of law reform. Traditionally, the state bar has provided much of the impetus for legislative re7
form throughout the various states. This is partially attributable to the
fact that the judiciary, because of its role in the legal system, is "not in
a good position to carry on promotional and lobbying activities in behalf of reform measures."' 8 While much of our law emanates from the
judiciary, that branch of our government is not involved in the creation
of statutory law.9 The general public is also unable, for the most part,
to engage itself in legislative reform because it is unfamiliar with the
1°
laws and the mechanics of the legal system.
The state bar, however, is in a unique position to accomplish law
reform for several reasons. First, the state bar is in a better position to
identify areas in which law reform is warranted because of the technical training of its members and the fact that they are constantly exposed to problematic areas of the law." Second, although some state
bars are subject to regulation due to their status as government agen13
cies,1 2 they are generally self-regulating, and thus are independent of
judicial and legislative restraints. Because of this independence, state

4. The organized bar is an association of lawyers whose purpose is to promote and maintain
the practice of law as a profession in order to further the administration of justice for the benefit
of the public. R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 14 (1953).
5. Id. In addition, Pound lists two other purposes: upholding the honor of the profession and
establishing discussions between members of the profession. Id. at 14-15. Most state bar associa-

tions have these goals listed in their charter in some form. Id. at 15.
6.
1964).

Seymour, The Bar as Lawmaker, in THE LIFE OF THE LAW 403, 403 (J. Honnold ed.

7. Winters, The National Movement toward Legal and Judicial Reform, 13 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 33, 52 (1968).
8. Id.
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465-66 (A. Hamilton) (J.Cooke ed. 1961).

10.

Winters, supra note 7, at 52.

11.
12.

Friedman, Law Reform in Historical Perspective, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 351, 356 (1968).
See, e.g., Address by Anthony Murray, president of the State Bar of California, at the

Conference of Bar Presidents, in Monterey, California (Feb. 12, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Murray address] (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
13. Murray, The Unified Bar Serves the Public
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss2/11
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bars can become involved in the legislative process whereas other governmental bodies, such as the judiciary, must refrain from involvement.
Finally, the state bars provide a forum in which a constant exchange of
ideas and information takes place among their members. 4 From this
exchange, legislative proposals are formulated. 5 Unlike the proposals
generated by individual members of the public, these proposals are
more likely to reach fruition due to the influence that accompanies the
size of bar associations.' 6
The impact of state bar organizations on legislative reform in the
various states has been extensive and has affected virtually every field
of law.' 7 For example, in 1983 and 1984, the Ohio State Bar Association was a major force in obtaining new and revised legislation in the
areas of probate, corporate, real property, and family law.' 8 The State
Bar of California has initiated reform in many areas, including those
dealing with family law, corporate law, and the rules of evidence.' 9
Likewise, the Illinois State Bar Association has recently sponsored two
major pieces of legislation that were enacted into law: the Business
Corporation Act of 1983 and a no-fault divorce provision.2 0
Along with serving as an instrument of law reform, the second
function that the state bar has undertaken in the lawmaking process is
that of analyzing proposed legislation and providing technical advice to
the drafters of such legislation. Because of the expertise of its members, the state bar can provide much needed technical and substantive
advice on significant or complicated legal issues. 2 ' The basis for such

14.

Petry, The Public Service Responsibility of the Bar, in COMMITMENT TO PUBLIC INTER-

EST LAW 4 (1980).

15. For example, the Ohio State Bar Association will typically offer 20-25 legislative proposals during a given legislative session. Interview with William Weisenberg, director of government affairs, Ohio State Bar Association, in Columbus, Ohio (Sept. 29, 1984) [hereinafter cited
as Weisenberg interview] (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
16. The average size of the state bar organization is approximately 10,300 members. Of the
56 state bars (this includes dual bar associations in some states), eight have over 20,000 members,
while the State Bar of California has over 75,000 members. The Ohio State Bar Association
numbers over 17,000. 1982-83 DIRECTORY OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS 30 (S.Palmer ed. 1982).
17. Seymour, supra note 6, at 414. While the accomplishments of the state bars are too
numerous to list here, specific examples include the Ohio State Bar Association's involvement in
Ohio's enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Ohio Revised Code. W. VAN AKEN,
BUCKEYE BARRISTERS 245, 272 (1980). The Mississippi State Bar was likewise successful in its
lobbying efforts for the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Mississippi State
Code. M. LANDON, THE HONOR AND DIGNITY OF THE PROFESSION 175 (1979).
18. "LEGIS-letter," 56 OHIo ST. B.A. REP. 1858, 1858-61 (1983). Senate Bill 104 was
signed into law on March 21, 1984. 1984 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-57, 5-58 (Baldwin).
19. Murray, supra note 13, at 56.
20. Letter from Marylou Lowder Kent, director of legislative affairs, Illinois State Bar Association, to Richard D. Anglin II (Oct. 10, 1984) (on file with University of Dayton Law
Review).
21. Weisenberg interview, supra note 15.
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advice is normally derived through analyzing pertinent case law, interpreting existing and proposed statutory law, and reviewing the legal
trends that exist in other states-all skills which are unique to the legal
profession. 2
These two functions which the state bar organization performs are
becoming increasingly important in today's legislative process. Histori23
cally, many of the members of a state legislature have been attorneys.
Therefore, much of the technical expertise that has been necessary for
the identification of problem areas of the law and the subsequent alleviation of those problems could be found within the statehouse itself.
However, in recent years, the number of attorneys serving in state legislatures has diminished, 4 thus increasing the need for an effective
state bar organization.
B. Improving the Administration of Justice and Advancing the Science of Jurisprudence
In pursuit of their traditional goals,2 5 the state bars have attempted to serve the public" by establishing a uniform and equitable
system of law. The state bar has taken on the responsibility of examining existing as well as proposed legislation in order to determine what
effect it has or will have on the legal system and ultimately on the
public.2 7 In furtherance of this responsibility, the state bar sponsors
legislation it views as important, or provides unbiased advice to those in
the legislature who request it.2" While individual members of the bar
may have their own personal preferences or opinions about legislative
measures, the deliberative process that occurs prior to the bar formally
announcing its position or pursuing a legislative proposal will ensure
that the views of the bar are as objective as possible and thus are of
maximum benefit to the public.29

22. Besides providing technical advice to the drafters of a bill, state bars often take positions
in support of or against legislative bills. Id. See also Quade, The Bar and the Legislature, BAR
LEADER, Mar.-Apr., 1983, at 4, 5 (estimated that the New Jersey State Bar Association would
follow 1500 bills in 1983).
23. Eulau & Sprague, Lawyers in Politics, in THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY 61, 61-62
(2d ed. 1976).
24. Quade, supra note 22, at 4; Middleton, Lawmakers Need Bars More and More, BAR
LEADER, July-Aug., 1982, at 9, 9.
25. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
26. Murray address, supra note 12.
27. Weisenberg interview, supra note 15.
28. Id.
29. In Ohio, for example, the genesis of a legislative proposal occurs at the subcommittee
level of the Ohio State Bar Association through a review of the current law. Out of these subcommittees will come an amendment or new legislation which is then recommended to the appropriate
committee. Such an amendment or legislation will carry with it a commentary explaining why the

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss2/11
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Despite the valuable role that bar associations play in the legislative process, this role has come under attack in recent years. Specifically, the attacks have been directed at the legislative activities of unified or integrated bar associations. Membership, as well as the payment
of dues, is required of all practicing attorneys in states which employ
the unified bar concept.3 0 Membership is not mandatory, however, in
voluntary bar associations such as Ohio's. 31 Consequently, members of
some of the unified bars have contended that their first amendment
rights have been violated because the unified bars have used their
mandatory dues to support legislative proposals or positions to which
these members are opposed.3 2 This activity, they contend, violates their
rights of free association, free speech, and free belief. 33 This is an issue
of extreme importance because of the adverse impact that it may have
on a unified bar's legislative activity and thus the overall legislative
system of those states. The remainder of this note will focus on the
controversy surrounding the unified bar and will examine whether, in
its present form or in some modified arrangement, it is a more effective
system than the voluntary system that is employed in Ohio.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Unified Bar under Attack

The first major challenge to the unified bar system was in 1961. In
the case of Lathrop v. Donohue,3 4 a member of the State Bar of Wisconsin sued for a refund of his mandatory dues on the grounds that
compulsory membership in the state bar amounted to an unconstitutional violation of his first amendment right of free association, and
that the use of his dues for legislative purposes infringed on his first
amendment right of freedom of speech. a5 The United States Supreme
Court, in the plurality opinion of Justice Brennan, held that compulchanges are needed, the effect they will have, and the overall effect that the revised or new law
will have. The committee will review the proposal and, if they feel it is appropriate, they will send
it to the Counsel of Delegates, which is the ruling body of the Ohio State Bar Association, where
it will be reviewed by both a screening committee and the members of the counsel. Individual
members of the bar are informed of the legislative proposal through the O.S.B.A. journal and are
thereby given a chance to form and present their own views. Id.
30. Note, Arrow v. Dow: The Legacy of Lathrop--State Bars under Attack, 8 OKLA. CITY
L. REV. 89, 89 n.2 (1983). Thirty-three states have unified or integrated bar systems. Id.
31. T. SWISHER, BAR UNIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES 32 (1975).
32. Quade, supra note 22, at 5.
33. See infra notes 34-72 and accompanying text.
34. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
35. Id. at 822-23. The plaintiff alleged that the state bar promoted law reform, made and
opposed legislative proposals, and lobbied for changes in " 'codes, laws and constitutional provisions.' " Id. at 822. This legislative activity was funded with his mandatory dues and was contrary
to his beliefs. Id.
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sory membership was constitutional. a6 The Court found that the state
had a legitimate interest in elevating the educational and ethical standards of the bar in order to improve the quality of legal services available to the people of Wisconsin.3 ' The Court then held that the means
used (e.g., compulsory membership) to fulfill the state's interest was
reasonable and thus did not violate the plaintiff's first amendment right
of association. 3 8 In addressing the second issue, the Court held that it
did not have the necessary facts 9 to determine whether the plaintiff's
right of free speech was violated and, therefore, it declined to resolve
the issue.4
The Supreme Court was given the opportunity to reconsider the
issue concerning freedom of association in Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education." The plaintiffs in that case were public school teachers who
were required to pay an agency fee to the local teachers' union.42 Although the teachers were not required to join the union, the service
charge levied on them was equal to the regular dues that the members
of the union were required to pay. 43 Like the plaintiff in Lathrop, the
teachers challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory charge because they claimed that part of it was used to support ideological and
political programs to which they were opposed. 4
The Court agreed with the plaintiff's contention that freedom of
association included the right not to be associated with a private
group's beliefs.4 5 That is, an individual should be free to believe, and in
a free society one's own beliefs should be shaped by his or her own
mind rather than by the state.4 " Although the Court held that the state
36. Id. at 843.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The Court felt that it did not have the necessary facts because the plaintiff neither
alleged any specific legislative activities engaged in by the bar nor indicated any of his views on
particular legislative proposals. Id. at 846.
40. Id. at 845-46. Both Justice Black and Justice Douglas, in separate dissents, thought the
record was adequate and would have ruled for the plaintiff on the freedom of speech issue. Id. at
877, 884-85. Justice Douglas also would have found for the plaintiff on the issue of free association. Id. at 884-85.
41. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
42. Id. at 212.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 213. The plaintiffs' complaint read "that the Union is engaged 'ina number and
variety of activities and programs which are economic, political, professional, scientific and religious in nature of which plaintiffs do not approve, and in which they will have no voice, and which
are not and will not be collective bargaining activities.' " Id.
45. Id. at 234.
46. Id. at 235. The Court recognized that at the heart of the first amendment is the idea
that an individual should be free to believe. Id. " 'If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss2/11
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could infringe upon this right, provided there was an important governmental interest,4 7 it also held that the union could not use the
mandatory charges to promote political or ideological beliefs that were
not germane to its duties as a collective bargaining representative. 48
While a union is not prohibited from promoting political causes or beliefs which are unrelated to its specific duties, this promotion can only
be financed by members who do not object to those beliefs.4 9
The ruling in Abood was extended to the activity of bar associations in Arrow v. Dow. 50 In that case, members of the New Mexico
State Bar brought an action for restitution of their bar dues that had
been spent by the bar in its lobbying efforts.51 Relying on the rule set
forth in Abood, the Arrow court held that the lobbying efforts of the
New Mexico State Bar did not serve important or compelling governmental interests. 52 Although the bar argued that its lobbying was constitutional since it related to advancing the administration of justice
and improving the legal system-both activities which are germane to
the reason the bar was created 53-the court ruled that these purposes
were too broad. According to the court, any issue lobbied for could
conceivably be related to the administration of justice or to the improvement of the legal system. 54 The court did agree, however, with the
Lathrop holding that improving the ethical and educational standards

faith therein.' " Id. at 235 (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943)).
The Court, in a footnote, also quoted James Madison who stated: " 'who does not see . . .
[t]hat the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property
for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in
all cases whatsoever?' " Id. at 234 n.31 (quoting 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 186 (Hunt
ed. 1901)).
47. Id. at 225.
48. Id. at 235-36. The Court noted several activities which were germane to a union's role
as a collective bargaining representative. For example, when a union bargains for abortion coverage as part of its negotiations for a medical benefit plan, it performs a function for which it is
created. Therefore, a member could not withhold dues even if he or she opposed such a plan. Id.
at 222-23. An example of an activity which is germane to a bar association's purpose would be
one involving continuing legal education. Falk v. State Bar (Falk I), 411 Mich. 63, 115, 305
N.W.2d 201, 217 (1981).
49. Abood, 431 U.S. at 236.
50. 544 F. Supp. 458 (D.N.M. 1982).
51. Id. at 459. The plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief. Id.
52. Id. at 463. Some of the legislation lobbied for which the court found did not serve
important governmental interests included a bill which clarified the Rules of Criminal Procedure
as applied to municipal courts, a bill modifying the judicial retirement system, a bill increasing
judicial salaries, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, a bill modifying the New Mexico
Mental Health Code, and bills which dealt with the education, examination, and licensing of
attorneys. Id. at 463.
53. Id. at 461.
54. Id. at 462.
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of lawyers was an important governmental interest which justified the
infringement upon the first amendment rights of attorneys. 5
The general holdings of Abood and Arrow recognize that lobbying
activities of an organization impinge upon the first amendment right of
free belief of its members if they are required to support the organization through mandatory fees or dues. Such an impingement is not unconstitutional, however, if the activity is germane to, or substantially
related to, an important, narrowly defined governmental interest for
which the organization is created. While Arrow dealt specifically with
the lobbying activity of the organization, the Abood decision was allencompassing in holding that "all group activities with political or ideo'6
logical significance touch on First Amendment rights." Thus, one
commentator has suggested that if the lobbying activity of a unified bar
association can be brought under the purview of Abood, then perhaps
all of the activities which a bar engages in while performing its legislative functions may be covered. 5 7 These activities include the filing of
amicus briefs, developing and publicizing bar positions on legislative
issues, and providing technical drafting assistance. 8
Whether these activities are in fact covered by the Abood holding
59
was the basis for discussion in Falk v. State Bar (Falk11). The plaintiff petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court for relief from the state
bar's use of his mandatory dues for a number of activities, including
lobbying and the promotion of political causes.6 " The court held that

55. Id. See supra text accompanying note 37.
56. Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept: Generalizingfrom the Wisconsin Case, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1, 64.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 418 Mich. 270, 342 N.W.2d 504 (1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 315 (1984). This was
the second time this case came before the Michigan Supreme Court. In the first case, Falk 1,411
Mich. 63, 305 N.W.2d 201, a majority decision was not reached because three members of the
court believed that the plaintiff was entitled to partial relief, two justices were of the opinion that
the plaintiff was not entitled to relief, and the remaining two justices thought that further hearings were required. Id. at 82-83, 305 N.W.2d at 201. The three justices who would have accorded
the plaintiff partial relief considered the use of mandatory dues for lobbying, taking legislative
positions, and providing technical drafting assistance to be impermissible infringements on the
first amendment freedoms of a bar's individual members. Id. at 115-116, 305 N.W.2d at 217.
Apparently, the only activities which they would not have deemed impermissible relate back to the
"educational and ethical" standards set forth in the Lathrop decision. Id.
60. Falk 11, 418 Mich. at 279, 342 N.W.2d at 505. Additionally, the plaintiff challenged
the use of his mandatory dues to finance the following:
(2) requiring compulsory membership in the Young Lawyers Section; (3) promoting prepaid legal services; (4) supporting lawyer referral services; (5) aiding in lawyer placement;
(6) maintaining a Client Security Fund; (7) promoting legal services and educating the
public through pamphlets, magazines, radio and television advertisements of the availability and need of legal services; (8) funding Lawyers Wives of Michigan and Children's
Charter of Michigan; (9) giving and paying for social functions, including receptions where

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss2/11
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the use of mandatory dues to support these activities was constitutional
because the government's substantial interest in the political activity of
the bar outweighed the injury that the plaintiff suffered as a result of
the bar's encroachment on his first amendment rights.6 1 In concluding
that the government has a substantial interest in the political activities
of the bar, the court reasoned that the bar's contribution to the legislative process is particularly valuable because of its collective knowledge.62 Another factor which influenced the court's decision was that
the plaintiff's injury was primarily financial. 63 He was not forced to
express his agreement with the bar's political positions, but in fact
could assert a contrary position. 4
The Abood, Arrow, and Falk II trilogy seems to indicate that the
legislative activity of an organization which is funded by mandatory
dues has a questionable future. Although Falk II upheld the bar's legislative activity, the court stated that the practices of the State Bar of
Michigan would be subject to scrutiny in the future and that a committee would be appointed to review the bar's legislative activities."' While
the United States Supreme Court has not yet considered the issue of
freedom of belief in the state bar setting, many unified state bars are
curtailing their legislative activity or are making provisions for their
dissident members in order to avoid litigation over whether their legislative activity is proper.6 6 Such action appears to be in accordance with
cases decided in the last four years which have placed limitations on
the type of activities that a state bar can fund with mandatory dues,6 7
or which have required the state bar to implement a refund or rebate

the Supreme Court Justices are guests of honor; (10) appearing before the State Officers
Compensation Commission in support of higher Supreme Court, and other judicial, salaries; and (I I) selling the use of the State Bar mailing roster to commercial interests.
Falk 1, 411 Mich., at 140-41, 305 N.W.2d at 229.
61. Falk 1!, 418 Mich. at 298-99, 342 N.W.2d at 514.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 297, 342 N.W.2d at 513.
64. Id. at 296-97, 342 N.W.2d at 513.
65. Id. at 270-71, 342 N.W.2d at 504. The Michigan Supreme Court has since required
that the bar determine the portion which is spent on lobbying and related activities. "Lawyers
may instruct the bar to spend that portion of their dues on other activities ..
" Frank, Supreme
Court Eases Mich. Dues Use Fears, BAR LEADER, Jan.-Feb., 1985, at 9. Meanwhile, Mr. Falk has
filed another suit challenging the Michigan State Bar's use of mandatory dues, this time in federal
district court. Frank, Falk I1I, 71 A.B.A. J. 20 (1985).
66. Weisenberg interview, supra note 15.
67. On petition to Amend Rule I of the Rules Governing the Bar, 431 A.2d 521 (D.C. App.
1981). The court upheld the validity of a referendum, which was passed by a majority of the bar
members, that limited the bar's use of mandatory dues to the following purposes: admission of
attorneys; discipline of attorneys; continued registration of attorneys; and maintenance of a client
security fund. Id. at 522.
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procedure for its dissident members.6 8 In Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico,6 9 the court went even further in concluding that
as long as the bar continued to engage in ideological or political activism, it could not compel its members to pay their dues.70
Although a recent Florida case7 1 upheld the constitutionality of
the Florida Bar's political activity, the majority of recent cases indicate
that the trend is against unified bars engaging in legislative activity
that is funded by mandatory dues. Because of this growing trend, there
is a strong possibility that the legislative systems in the states which
have unified bars will be losing a valuable source of legislative proposals and technical advice. The question, then, is whether the unified bar,
in either its traditional or in a modified version, can remain as effective
as the voluntary bar in its legislative activities. From another perspective, the attacks on the unified bar give rise to the issue of whether the
voluntary status of the Ohio State Bar Association is the most effective
vehicle for promoting new legislation.
B.

Which Bar System is Best for Ohio?

There are currently three organizational options available to the
Ohio State Bar Association in furtherance of its legislative activities.
The first alternative is the traditional unified status whereby legislative
activity is funded by mandatory dues. The second alternative is a modified version of the unified bar whereby a dues rebate is provided for
those members who are opposed to the bar's legislative activity. The
final alternative is retaining the present voluntary system in which all
funding of legislative activity is derived from voluntary contributions.
While all three alternatives may be viable, the following analysis will
indicate that the third alternative is the most desirable.
1.

Traditional Unified Status

This course of action may still be viable in light of the Florida
Supreme Court's decision in In re Amendment to Integration Rule of
the Florida Bar,72 which departed from the current trend of striking
down the legislative activities of unified bar associations. The court in
68. See Reynolds v. State Bar, - Mont. __, 660 P.2d 581 (1983) (holding that state
bar could not use mandatory dues for lobbying purposes unless a refund provision was established); Report of Committee to Review the State Bar, 112 Wis. 2d xix, 334 N.W.2d 544 (1983)
(court approved rebate plan as recommended by a court committee).
69. 565 F. Supp. 963 (D.P.R. 1983).
70. Id. at 978-79.
71. In re Amendment to Integration Rule of the Florida Bar, 439 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1983)
(holding that political activities were germane to the compelling state interest of improving the
administration of justice and advancing the science of jurisprudence).
72. Id.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss2/11
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that case recognized the importance of the state bar in the legislative
process,7 3 and noted that members who are opposed to the bar's activities have ample opportunity to make their views known to the bar or to
the general public.7 4 The court further reasoned that a dissenting member is never forced to proclaim any political view or to engage in any
"personally-repugnant political activity." 75 However, while the decision
of the Florida Supreme Court indicates that the legislative activities of
traditional unified bar associations may win the approval of some
courts, the cost of litigating the claims of dissident members may continue to make it an unattractive option.
2.

Modified Unified Bar-Establishment of a Rebate Procedure

The second alternative is a unified system which provides for a
dues rebate to those members who are opposed to the bar's legislative
activity. This remedy was recognized in Abood when the Court approved the rebate procedure that had been established by the teachers'
union."6 The rebate procedure provided for a refund of a portion of the
dues or fees paid by the dissenting employee.7 7 The refund was based
on the proportion that the union's political expenditures bore to its total
expenditures, as calculated by the union. 78 This refund was then followed by a reduction of the employee's future dues or fees by the same
proportion .79
The Court, while approving the rebate procedures, held that employees should only have to indicate that they are opposed to ideological expenditures of any kind. 80 According to the Court, to require any
greater specificity would place a considerable burden on the employees,
requiring them to monitor all union expenditures in order to determine
whether any expenditures are unrelated to the union's primary
functions. 8 1
At least two state bars have implemented a rebate procedure since
the Abood decision. In March of 1983, the Supreme Court of Montana
declared that the State Bar of Montana could not use compulsory dues
for lobbying purposes unless a refund procedure was established for
dissenting bar members.82 In response to this declaration, the state bar

73.
74.
75.
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77.
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Id. at 214.
Id. at 214-15.
Id. at 215.
Abood, 431 U.S. at 240.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 241.
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adopted a refund resolution which was approved by the court in September, 1983.83 The refund resolution, as interpreted by the court, allows a dissenting member to obtain a refund on any specific piece of
legislation that the state bar lobbied for. Alternatively, the dissenting
member may obtain a refund of all dues relating to lobbying efforts. 8
A similar provision was approved by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
1983, and allows a dissenting member of the Wisconsin State Bar to
request a refund of dues expended for all legislative activity or a refund
of dues expended for any specific legislative activity.85
Although constitutional challenges have not been asserted against
either of these two rebate procedures, the unified bar in Puerto Rico
recently had its rebate procedure struck down8 8 as showing "total disregard or unbelievable callousness as to the membership's right to be free
from compelled expression." 8 7 The procedure was fairly complex and
required the dissenter to allege sufficient facts in order to obtain the
rebate. 88 Such a provision violated the Abood requirement that the dissenting member be able to maintain his or her own beliefs without public disclosure. 89
While the rebate procedures in Montana and Wisconsin do not
appear to violate the Abood requirement, they may still be challenged
on the basis that dissenting members are temporarily deprived of their
financial resources90 while such money is being used for legislative activity to which they are opposed. This prospect was addressed in Abood
by Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in which he noted that even
though it had approved the union's rebate procedure, the Court's decision had not foreclosed the argument that a union might have to establish a procedure which would avoid the risk that a dissenting member's
dues would be used, even temporarily, to finance unrelated ideological

83. Reynolds v. State Bar of Montana, No. 83-09, slip op. at 3 (Mont. Sept. 15, 1983)
(order approving refund procedure).
84. Id. at 1-2. The petitioners argued that the specific wording of the resolution required
them to disclose their private opinions concerning individual lobbying expenditures and thus was
in violation of Abood. The court ruled against this contention, noting that the state bar did not
intend the resolution to be construed that way. Id. at 2. It is still too early to tell whether these
rebate procedures will have an impact on the lobbying activities of the State Bar of Montana.
Letter from George L. Bousliman, executive director, State Bar of Montana, to Richard D. Anglin II (Oct. 4, 1984).
85. Review the State Bar, 112 Wis. 2d at xxiv, 334 N.W.2d at 548.
86. Schneider, 565 F. Supp. at 975-77.
87. Id. at 976.
88. Id. at 975.
89. Id. at 976.
90. In both states, the rebate is determined after the lobbying has occurred. Reynolds,
, 660 P.2d at 581; Review the State Bar, 112 Wis. 2d at xxiv, 334 N.W.2d at 548.
Mont. at

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss2/11

1985]

LEGISLATION NOTE

activities." While the state bars have not been challenged by this argument, a line of cases involving employee unions and university students
has suggested that dissenting members cannot be required to temporarily support unrelated political and legislative activity. 2 Accordingly,
one commentator believes that if the unified bars are similarly challenged, they may also be prohibited from collecting money for unrelated ideological activities, even though they provide for some type of
rebate.9"
One possible solution to this problem may be to place the membership dues of a dissenting member into an escrow account until the portion of dues which are unrelated to the bar's purpose is determined.9 4
However, while this may provide the necessary protection for a dissenting member, it also places a burden on the bar association insofar as a
portion of its normal operating funds would be tied up in escrow. In
any event, the success of the "escrow" option would likely depend on
the nature of the bar's activities. Provided that it is not involved in very
controversial legislative activities, such as abortion or capital punishment, the use of the escrow account may be minimal due to a low number of dissenting members. If the bar does take some fairly controversial positions, an escrow account may impose more costs than benefits.
3.

The Voluntary Bar-Maintaining the Status Quo

The final alternative, and the system which is currently used in
Ohio, is the voluntary bar association. Under the voluntary bar system,
legislative activities are funded by voluntary donations. One obvious
advantage to this system is that a bar's "hands" are not tied by dissenting members. Under the present structure, a unified bar risks being
sued for recovery of dues paid by dissenting members or being enjoined
from participating in legislative activity.9 5 Under the voluntary system,

91. Abood, 431 U.S. at 244.
92. See Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1, 743 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1984)
(union must establish procedure which will ensure that dissenting nonmembers' agency fees are
not used for any activities which are not germane to collective bargaining); Galda v. Bloustein,
686 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1982) (compulsory student fee used to support research group could not be
collected, despite rebate provision, as it temporarily exacted funds from those who were unwilling
to pay); Beck v. Communications Workers, 468 F. Supp. 93 (D. Md. 1979) (union enjoined from
collecting amounts in excess of that required for its related purposes from agency-fee payors).
93. Schneyer, supra note 56, at 66-67.
94. See School Comm. v. Greenfield Educ. Ass'n., 385 Mass. 70, 431 N.E.2d 180 (1982)
(use of escrow account pending adjudication of permissible amount minimizes impact on the constitutional rights of the dissenting employee by preventing any compulsory subsidization of objectionable activities); Ball v. City of Detroit, 84 Mich. App. 383, 269 N.W.2d 607 (1978) (service
fees of non-members should be paid into escrow account pending determination of portion of fees
to which union is entitled).
95. Weisenberg interview, supra note 15.
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however, members who object to a bar's legislative activity can simply
decline to join the bar.9" Furthermore, if a person is already a member,
there is still the option of abandoning the bar at the end of the membership term.9 7
An additional reason for adopting a voluntary bar system is that
the justifications for employing a unified bar system rather than a voluntary bar system no longer exist. The bar associations, which began
their formation in the 1870's, were all of a voluntary nature.9 8 A unification movement began in the early part of the century due to a general attitude that voluntary bars were ineffective in the area of law
reform.9 9 Several reasons contributed to this general attitude-the first
being that a voluntary bar was unable to afford a full-time staff in
order to keep the bar membership aware of legislative developments
and to make the legislature aware of bar positions.10 0 However, this
may no longer be a concern as only a small portion of a state bar's
budget is devoted to legislative activities.10 1 A second argument which
was advanced by proponents of unified bars was that voluntary bars
received little respect from the legislature due to their poor membership levels.10 2 However, the relatively high membership rates that the
voluntary bars have today also refutes this argument. It was also argued that because a voluntary bar did not have 100% membership, it
could never present the views of the entire profession.03 While this
point may still be true, it is probably applicable to the unified bars as
well. Although a unified bar receives the financial participation of all
the attorneys practicing within its state, this does not necessarily mean
that all of the members concur in the views espoused by the bar. This
notion is certainly apparent in view of the recent rise in litigation over
the unified bar's legislative activity.
Finally, it should be noted that many of the legislative achievements which were referred to earlier apply to the voluntary bar system
as well as the unified bar system.' 04 Voluntary bar associations have

96. Quade, supra note 22, at 5.
97. Lascher, Dismantle the Unified Bar, CAL. LAW., May, 1983, at 1, 12.
98. T. SWISHER, supra note 30, at 2.
99. Schneyer, supra note 56, at 25.
100. Id. at 26.
101. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 56, at 26 (Wisconsin spends only 2% of its budget on
legislative activities); Bar Services Report, 58 FLA. BAR J., 19, 34-35 (L. Yates ed. Sept. 1984)
(Florida Bar allocated only 2% of its 1984-85 General Fund Budget to legislation).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. While the accomplishments of the voluntary bars are too numerous to list, both the
Ohio State Bar Association and the Illinois State Bar Association have been quite active. See
supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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had much success in their legislative activities.' n5
An argument which is currently put forth by advocates of the unified bar is that a unified bar represents a commitment to the public
interest because it is a public corporation or agency.' 06 While a voluntary bar usually serves the public interest, there is no legal compulsion
to do so; thus it is contended that voluntary bars are likely to be involved in more self-serving programs than are unified bars. 0 7 In contrast, because it is a public corporation, a unified bar is legally committed, as well as morally and ethically committed, to acting on behalf of
the public interest. 0 8 Proponents of the voluntary system contend, however, that forbearance from self-serving legislative pursuits began long
before the bar unification movement took place,' 0 9 and that tradition is
still evident in the practices of the voluntary bar associations. 10 Moreover, while it is true that the voluntary bars are under no legal commitment to serve the public, a strong argument can be made that when
they do act to serve the public, voluntary bars may be more effective
since they are not confronted with the threat of litigation that faces the
unified bars.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Ohio State Bar Association has recently lost some of the
rights and privileges it had enjoyed for many years. The curtailment of
these rights and privileges has seemingly tarnished the integrity of the
state bar. Nevertheless, the bar's legislative activity continues to play
an eminent role in the passage of important laws. The O.S.B.A. has an
outstanding legislative record and its accomplishments are deserving of
recognition.
This note, while focusing on the legislative role of state bar associations, has also compared the unified bar with the voluntary bar
(and a modified version of the unified bar), in an attempt to determine
whether the voluntary system as adopted by the Ohio State Bar Association is the most effective vehicle for engaging in legislative activity.
Today, such voluntary bars are viable organizations that have had
much success in their legislative endeavors. In addition, high membership rates and continued lobbying success indicate that many of the
105. See, e.g., T. SWISHER, supra note 30, at 60.
106. Murray, supra note 19, at 13.
107. Address by Anthony Murray, president of the State Bar of California, at the National
Conference of Bar Presidents, in Atlanta, Georgia (July 28-Aug. 4, 1983) (on file with University
of Dayton Law Review).
108. Letter from Anthony Murray, past president, State Bar of California, in BAR LEADER,
March-Apr., 1984, at 30.
109. See Lascher, supra note 97, at 54; Schneyer, supra note 56, at 29.
110. Schneyer, supra note 56, at 29.
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reasons for which the voluntary systems were abandoned by some
states in favor of unified systems are no longer valid. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the voluntary bars are not affected by the constitutional challenges which have beset the unified bars. They can operate freely and without fear of attack from dissident members. Because
of these factors, it is clear that the voluntary system continues to be the
best system for not only the Ohio State Bar Association, but for other
state bar associations as well.
Richard D. Anglin H

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol10/iss2/11

